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Friday, October 06, 2006

Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Machines: Why Manufacturing Processes Should not be Closed

Here's a quick summary of the security analysis (8M pdf, in English) of the ES3B voting computer, manufactured by Nedap/Groendendaal. This type of apparatus is used to collect about 90% of all the votes for local and federal elections held in the Netherlands. (A slightly modified version of this type of voting computer is also used in Germany and France.)

The analysis is performed by a Dutch Citizens' Movement, whose name can be roughly translated into the We Don't Trust Voting Computers Foundation. Despite the arguably provocative name, their research project (various materials, in english) and the culminating report concerning the Nedap/Groenendaal voting computer seem fairly sound and objective.

To put it mildy, the report does not shine a favourable light on the quality of the voting machine for its intended purpose. The findings in the report appeared on Dutch national television on 5 october 2006. The publication of the report was slashdotted.

The whole affair would be quite entertaining (the report learns you how to turn the voting computer into a fairly lousy but fully functional chess-player) if not for the disturbing denial by both the Dutch authorities and the manufacturer concerning the obvious risks of fraudulent abuse of these voting machines if used in democratic elections. The total lack of convincing procedures to test the correct functioning of the machines are equally uncanny. The report describes fairly simple fixes for all of the flaws found during a months time research of only a few of these voting machines.

The final conclusion is that although the design of the machines includes data redundancy and independence of remote resources to remedy technical failures, no efforts seem to have been made at all to build safety measures against malignant use for fraudulent purposes. Instead, the manufacter openly advocates reliance on obscuring details about both the hardware and the sofware, claiming that openness would only benefit a small elite, which probably consists mainly of characters that seek to abuse that knowledge for malignent purposes.

Some quotes from the report:
Dutch election law requires physical keys to be used as part of an electronic voting system.
The key system chosen [...] for [the] locks [...] always comes with the same key [...] the same key is used [...] throughout The Netherlands. Spare keys can be ordered [...] for roughly a Euro [....]. We ordered [...] 100 of these keys without any problem. [...] typical applications for this lock include “copy machines and office furniture” [...] this [...] type of lock [can be opened] with a bent paperclip.
The Nedap ES3B system as it is in use by a typical Dutch municipality consists of multiple S3B voting computers, at least as many ballot memory modules, a reader unit to be attached to a PC via the serial port and an installed copy of the ISS (Integraal Stem Systeem) software running on a PC under Microsoft Windows.
(ISS or Integraal Stem Systeem translates to Integral Voting System)
For those that are more visually orientated, a slide of a typical setup is available from the manufacturers' site:

More quotes from the report:

The ISS software has a ‘maintenance mode’ that is supposed to be only accessible to members of the “verkiezingswacht”, the Nedap election-day helpdesk. You need a password to get the software in this mode. A quick look in the binary revealed this password to be “GEHEIM”, the Dutch word for “SECRET”. The maintenance mode, among other things, allows the helpdesk to read the binary contents of a ballot module plugged into the programming slot of a reader unit. By sniffing the serial commands between the ISS software and the reader unit, we figured out how to issue these commands ourselves and subsequently wrote a program in Tcl that we could use to read the entire contents of a ballot memory module.
We claimed [that] the Nedap was just another computer, and [that it could be programmed] to play chess or to lie about the election results. ...[the manufacturer spokesperson said that] "[with] regard to the claim that our machine can play chess: I’d like to see that demonstrated”. [...] our first goals now [...] was to make [the voting machine] play chess.

For the benefit of the non-Dutch readers, here are a few relevant paraphrases translated from the manufacturer's spokesperson (which appears to be the owner of the business himself, Jan Groenendaal):
It may be true that the technical knowledge concerning the operation of the system is known to only a limited group, but that does not have to be a problem.
I would very much like to see a demonstration of the statement that it is also possible to play a game of chess with our voting machines.
We understand the concern raised against personal computer based voting machines...However, our voting machine is a Dedicated Special Purpose Machine, meant for counting votes and nothing else. It merely records the pressing of buttons on a keyboard, but in very, very secure manner. [...] In addition, we have always taken care for the voting machines to work "stand alone", that is: without any network connections to exclude any external influences. Therefore, Hackers absolutely don't stand a chance.
One of the objections we repeatedly face is that the source code of the embedded software is not publicly available. There is some merit in that argument. However this is caused by the government policy which is directed at providing municipalities with voting machines from commercial vendors that operate in a free market. Because of competition, vendors shield their intellectual properties. [...] This should not be blown out of proportion.
Opening the sourcecode would allow only a small circle of people to judge it, which when then form just a very small new elite. For sure, this is no guarantee that individuals can understand the machine's operation. [...] "Open Source Software" advocates claim an increase in software quality when there is freedom to propose or contribute enhancements. This may be true for certain wide-spread applications. Elections are however not such an application. Opening up the source increases the possibilities for an attack by malignant forces. The fact that only a small group of people have inside knowledge might also be regarded as a positive thing.

Well, after reading this I think most people can probe the satisfaction the hackers must've felt after all the efforts they must've endured before they could finally write this:
After having learned roughly how the hardware worked we used a gcc 68000 crosscompiler to create a Nedap IO-library containing functions to initialize the system, write data to the display, read the keyboard, and write debug messages to the UART. [...] we then managed to compile and run Tom Kerrigan's Simple Chess Program (TSCP). This was non-trivial only because we had to squeeze out quite a few tables to make it run using only the available 16 kBytes of RAM.
It knows all the rules and every now and then it can be surprisingly clever for what it is. But in all honesty we have to admit that it does not play chess all that well.

Then, playtime is definitevely over:
When we started to think about demonstration software that would lie about election results (called “Nedap PowerFraud”), we kept in mind that the system should not lie after an election that was obviously a test of the system. We decided we needed to store the votes and only decide whether or not to perform the fraud at the moment the election was closed, so our program would have as much information as possible to make that decision.
The ES3B’s EEPROM [...stores...] a few system configuration parameters [...] and some settings [...] most of the space is used for two circular buffers holding [logs]. In these logs, the device keeps the system time [...] these times are not as helpful as one might think [...] We updated the circular buffer routines that deal with the error log [...] making space for our stolen votes [...] we steal votes only from the number one on each list. Since the majority of voters pick the first candidate on a given party’s list, this is quite acceptable.
We then built “hooks” into the regular ES3B code. Every time a voter casts a ballot, our code generates a random number [...] If the number is below the programmed percentage of votes we want to steal, that vote is not written to the ballot module [but to the corrupted log]. At the end of the election, our software determines whether this was a real election or not. It then [writes] these votes into [...] the ballot module, just like the real software does.

Now it might seem far fetched to reprogam the EEPROM's. However:
To determine the recipient of the stolen votes, PowerFraud does a case-insensitive match of all party names with a programmed string. If it finds a match, that party becomes the recipient of he stolen votes. This allows for the fraudulent EPROMs to be inserted long before the candidate lists are known, and it allows a fraudulent ROM to perform the same fraud year after year, even though the relative position of the party on the keyboard changes. It is significant to note that the Dutch interior ministry assumes this to be impossible. A recent statement 13 says: “Fraud during the production of voting machines does not make sense because the lists of candidates are not known then.

The authors then show that in the present implementation, there is not much chance of detecting the fraudulent behaviour of the voting machine. Also, there are no physical means that allow anybody to check whether or not the machine has been tampered with. So basically, all it takes once you have the reporgrammed EEPROM, is fairly short amount of time to replace it. It can then sit there for years and years in the machine to steal votes.

Apart from this, to me, quite intimidating attack a number of other, simple hacks are mentioned:
It would appear that if a special character is displayed, the controller has to do extra work every time the display is updated. This causes the display refresh frequency to drop from 72Hz to 58 Hz. The difference between these two frequencies can be determined by ear. In The Netherlands, the name of the major political party CDA is written in full on the display when the voter chooses any CDA candidate: “Christen Democratisch Appèl”. So using only a simple scanner or short-wave receiver, we can tell whether or not a voter is currently voting for a party or candidate with an accent in the name.
In all cases we could receive the signal at a few meters. In one case we could receive the signal up to 25 meters away. [...] We also noticed energy present at 3845 Hz when the vote-button is pressed.

Shortly after the television broadcast, a little reponse appeared on the manufacturer's website:
It occurred to us that our machine works remarkably well. The voting machine does exactly what it is told to do. This was completely expected behaviour, as was confirmed by all involved. We can only conclude that the name of the citizens' movement that calls itself the "We Don't Trust Voting Computers Foundation" depicts our machine in an unjust manner. We feel that the "We Don't Trust People Foundation" would have been a more suitable name.

Personally, I would not vouch that opening up the manufacturing process of these voting machines are a guarantee to twart these kinds of attacks. However, what frightens me is the trust placed by the manufacturer by the 'security' gained from obscurity. Clearly, their statement that the voting machine does exaclty what people tell it to do is not true. Nobody intended the machine to emit the radiation that allows one to see when the "vote" button is pushed.

Also, given that fact that these undoubtedly devoted hackers still took only a month to know probably more about this machine than most of the employees of the manufacturer, does not really convince when the manufacturer claims that it needs to keep everything closed in order to guard their intellectual property.

Frankly, it seems that striving towards a free market for voting machines (which, according to the Nedap spokesman, is a policy of the Dutch government) is probably better served when the manufacturers would be obliged to open up every single bit of the manufacturing process. This kind of "quality through openness" sure is one of the main reasons why I joined MySQL. I strongly and firmly believe in openness as a drive that is especially suitable to drive commercial product development.

Anyway - would my vote count? Next month's elections could be particularly interesting.

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

I'm very concerned about the voting machines used in elections in the United States. Our elections are not free and fair anymore. Our "elected" officials are ignoring directions from their constituents with impunity -- because their jobs aren't on the line, as long as they can "get elected" next time too. It doesn't matter who votes, it matters who counts the votes.

Princeton University recently studied the Diebold machines and gives them a very negative score here: